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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      CONVERGEN ENERGY LLC, ET AL.,
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                     Plaintiffs,
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                                               20 CV 3746 (LJL)
                 v.
                                              TRO Telephone Conference
      STEVEN J. BROOKS, ET AL.,
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                     Defendants.
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                                               New York, N.Y.
9
                                               May 19, 2020
                                               4:04 p.m.
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      Before:
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                            HON. LEWIS J. LIMAN,
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                                               District Judge
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                         APPEARANCES VIA TELEPHONE
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      SEIDEN LAW GROUP, LLP
           Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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      BY: MICHAEL STOLPER
           DOV B. GOLD
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      Theodore John Hansen and Brian R. Mikkelson
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      BY: BENJAMIN LaFROMBOIS
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           PATRICK WELLS
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           MELANIE PERSICH
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           Attorneys for Defendants Steven J. Brooks, Gregory Merle,
     Nianticvista Energy LLC and Riverview Energy Corporation.
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      BY: RYAN M. BILLINGS
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(The Court and all parties appearing telephonically) 1 THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Liman. Who 2 3 do we have on the phone for the plaintiffs? 4 MR. STOLPER: Good afternoon, Judge. This is Michael 5 Stolper on behalf of the plaintiffs. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 6 7 And who do we have -- I know there are a lot of people on the phone. I really think I just need whoever is going to 8 9 be speaking. Who do we have on for defendants? Do we have 10 anybody for defendants? 11 MR. BILLINGS: Good afternoon, your Honor. 12 Ryan Billings from Kohner, Mann & Kailas, specially appearing 13 for Steven Brooks, Gregory Merle, Nianticvista Energy LLC and 14 Riverview Energy Corporation. 15 MR. LaFROMBOIS: This is attorney Ben LaFrombois for 16 Convergen Energy Wisconsin, Mr. Ted Hansen and Mr. Brian 17 Mikkelson. 18 THE COURT: Now, I heard one defense counsel say you were specially appearing. Can you explain to me what that 19 20 means? 21 MR. BILLINGS: Certainly, your Honor. None of my 22 clients have been served, and we intend to contest jurisdiction 23 and venue. So I'm appearing solely to monitor that my clients'

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, who was just speaking?

rights are not violated without due process.

MR. BILLINGS: Sorry. That was Ryan Billings. I have already violated your rule already. I apologize.

THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

THE COURT: So I have in front of me the plaintiff's application for a TRO and a preliminary injunction. I'm prepared to hear first from plaintiff's counsel, and then I'll hear from defense counsel.

I would ask you, first, to speak slowly, and second, to identify who you are. Assume that I have read the papers; so I don't think I need you to go through in detail everything that you are saying, just the high points.

For plaintiff's counsel, I might tell you that one of the questions that I had goes to the reach of your proposed TRO and whether you need anything other than what is in (a) and maybe (e). But let me hear first from plaintiff's counsel, and then I'll hear from defense counsel.

MR. STOLPER: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is
Michael Stolper on behalf of the plaintiffs, and we are
seeking, at the TRO stage, to cut off the defendant's access to
our electronic files, and I have the proposed order to show
cause up in front of me. And I think certainly (a) is what we
are looking for. I believe you had said -- was the other
letter that you had indicated was (e)?

THE COURT: (e) for expedite discovery.

MR. STOLPER: Okay. And I apologize because I notice

there are two (e)s. But the first (e) with respect to expedited discovery is certainly something we are looking for, and also (d), where we're asking for equipment to be turned over because it's our understanding that that equipment contains our proprietary files.

And concerning -- in order to implement (a), we're hoping to get (d), as we're referring to it. And we're also looking for -- affirmatively, we are looking for administrator access to the Convergen e-mails and to the e-mails for the Convergen Latvia entity so that we can put an end to the cyber attack and put those protections in place that we articulated in our papers.

So I think that is what we were looking for at the TRO stage. I think, as your Honor mentioned, you've read our papers. The context of the application comes within a fraudulent scheme that we've articulated in our complaint and in our papers. And what we're looking for now is to cut off access that the defendants never should have had, and in particular, we're talking about the defendants that are on this call.

The only defendants that are not on this call or not represented on this call are those that are in Spain, and they do have counsel that has responded to me. He's in New York, but he is contesting jurisdiction. He was provided with notice of today's call, but I take it that he's chosen not to

participate in this call.

But everyone else, all the other defendants and in particular the ones that would be impacted by the relief that we are seeking, are on this call, both directly as defendants and also by counsel. And so that's what we are seeking at the TRO stage.

I should say that we appreciate, on the plaintiffs' side, the promptness and the availability of the Court today at 4:00 for something that we filed just this morning. And with that, I'm open to any other questions you may have.

THE COURT: Yes. Let me ask you a question about the proposed relief. You'll correct me if I'm wrong, but as I understand (a), all that that would do, but it does seem to do a lot, is it protects your electronic files and your proprietary data or trade secrets from use by the defendants. Is that right, it's limited to your electronic files and your proprietary data and your trade secrets?

MR. STOLPER: Correct.

THE COURT: But if I go to (b) and (c), what is to assure me that that account and that domain will not be over-inclusive, and won't those materials include material that either belongs to the defendants or is not a trade secret of the plaintiff?

MR. STOLPER: That's a good question. Let me -there's a very big distinction between (b), as in boy, and (c),

as in Charlie.

Let me start with (b). That's easy. That's referring to the Latvia entity, EuroenergyBiogas.com, that domain, and the Office 365 account associated with that domain. That has to do with Convergen Latvia's entity. That has nothing to do with the defendant's business, the pellet plant in Wisconsin.

They should have never had access to that. They had no basis for having access to that, and they don't have any of their information, or shouldn't have any of their information, intermingled with Latvia's Office 365 account and domain. So there, there's absolutely no risk of their information coming our way. That one is very straightforward and just sort of highlights sort of the egregious nature of what's taken place here.

(c), Romanette letter (c) in our proposed order to show cause, C as in Charlie, that one, ConvergenEnergy.com, that Office 365 account, as I understand it, contains information both of the defendant, the Wisconsin pellet plant, and those on the plaintiffs' side that have a ConvergenEnergy.com e-mail. So there is some confluence there under ConvergenEnergy.com.

So we had asked for -- prior to filing the suit, we had asked for access to that account because we needed it for a couple of reasons. One, to ward off the cyber attack and to see what accounts are there and what's being accessed

independent of the pellet plant personnel account, e-mail accounts that are there, and that was denied.

So there, there needs to be some segregation. Now, that's complicated but that complication is by their own doing. We should never be in the position that we are in today. That type of segregation should have been done prior to January 31, 2020. And the reason we're in this position, as articulated in our papers, is because the very person and people who were responsible for plaintiffs' side, for representing the seller entity and protecting seller's assets that are now part of this ConvergenEnergy.com Office 365 account, are the very people that were double dealing and, in particular, Mr. Brooks; the defendant, Steven Brooks.

And so I acknowledge that that account is probably complicated, but as I indicated, that's a problem of their own doing. And so we think that the Court should grant us that access so that we can fix a problem that they've created, and it's a problem that they've created in terms of their —

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a second, and let me just treat these separately. Maybe you can tell me I shouldn't treat them separately but they are both points with respect to (c).

With respect to migrating the plaintiffs' e-mail and data back to you and to your clients, why do you need that on an emergency basis if I were to restrain the defendants from

accessing that information or using it during the pendency of the action?

MR. STOLPER: That's actually the point I was just about to make. There's two sort of points of access that we have articulated in our papers. One is access by the defendants as the administrator, and if you're ordering them not to access it, presumably if they follow your order, that would address part of the concern.

The other part is that there is an unknown third-party hacker who has conducted some type of cyber attack and may have accessed Convergen Energy e-mail accounts that still belong to us, still belong to plaintiff entities. We don't know, and so we need access, and that's what the chief information officer from our side had asked for prior to the suit, in order to just see what's happened and put protections in the place to prevent any further attack. And that's what we were rebuffed with.

So I think just telling the defendants not to access this information, I don't know how practical that is, but it still presents a problem from this unknown third party that's presented a hack, and that's why we needed it. We're not looking to probe, at this point, into their proprietary files or their e-mails. You know, what we're trying to do is protect our own at the TRO stage.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you address (d) for me. Are you asking for that at the TRO stage? It is, to me,

rather aggressive.

MR. STOLPER: Well, this equipment -- it is aggressive, your Honor, because it's mandatory. It's not reactive. It's not asking them to maintain the status quo. We're asking for mandatory relief, and I recognize that we're doing it at the TRO stage, but the reason we're doing this is they have no right to it. They are holding onto equipment that belongs to us, that contains our files, that they should have returned at the end of their employment, that they didn't. And so they have no basis for holding onto it.

THE COURT: I'm going to hear from defense counsel in a moment, but on the assumption that there are going to be some disputed issues, why do you need that, again, at the TRO stage rather than at a preliminary injunction stage? The purpose of a TRO usually is to preserve the status quo, as I think about it.

MR. STOLPER: It is to preserve the status quo, but there is law that allows us to, you know, seek what they refer to as some type of mandatory relief, an affirmative step, and the is the one affirmative step, aside from the administrator access that we were just talking about actually handing over.

They can hand it over to the Court. They don't need to hand it over to us, but they have hardware that doesn't belong to them that they could access and that we'd have to trust them at their word that they're not deleting things on

there.

It's cell phones and laptops. I don't know forensically how much we can recreate from a cell phone. I know we can go pretty deeply on the laptop, if somebody violated the order, violated an order and deleted files. But these — as I say, these are our assets that we own. They should be turned over, taken away from the actors, from the bad actors here.

And they've gone -- we've got in our complaint and we've articulated in our papers, they took affirmative steps to use cloak and dagger methods here. Mr. Brooks communicated through a Gmail account, not through his corporate account. They took steps in the electronic media front to hide and cover up what they'd done.

It would be asking a lot for all of us to then trust that today that they're not going to take — continue to take steps to try to cover up what they've done. It seems pretty simple to hand over equipment that they have no business holding onto, or any justification for having. And if there's concern about turning it over to us, turn it over to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from defense counsel, unless there's anything else you want me to know.

MR. STOLPER: No, no. That's good. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Thank you, your Honor. This is

attorney Ben LaFrombois. I want to make note that we are appearing subject to jurisdictional objections. Depending on the outcome of this hearing, that will be the next step, most likely, that the Court would be hearing would be jurisdictional matters regarding the case.

I would like to be responsive and concise. I'd like to make just a few points to the Court. One, the data and product, the assets that are being requested were transferred to Convergen Wisconsin in the transaction that occurred January 31, 2020. The transaction occurred arising from negotiations and involvement of — between Libra and Steve Brooks and others.

Mr. Fidel Andueza is an employee, the chief investment officer, of Libra, and plaintiffs' counsel referred to e-mail, an e-mail account that was used. Well, the e-mail account was used at the request of the employee of Libra, who was fully aware of the structure of this transaction. And the fanciful case of fraud is exactly that.

I want to point out to the Court that there really is no emergency here, and the plaintiffs have failed to disclose that there is an emergency. This transaction closed on January 31. In the plaintiffs' complaint you will see that they allege there that they became aware of this fraud the day after, in contrast to the supporting documents submitted to the Court today, where they say that they became aware sometime in

April. I think we have a very significant factual discrepancy within the plaintiffs' pleadings.

So back to the acquisition agreement. In that acquisition agreement there's six pages that addresses the transfer of intellectual property. Prior to the sale of -- the transfer of the company and the sale of the assets, Libra had unfettered and unrestricted access to this intellectual property that now they would like to acquire today under so-called emergency. And the true value to them is shown by the fact that they didn't acquire it prior to the close of the transaction.

So other events have arisen, and I think this whole question of fraud is rather spurious. And as we litigate this matter, the truth will come forward.

The Court should be aware also, you know, today's motion was brought on four hours' notice. Similarly, a week ago yesterday we received a demand from plaintiffs' counsel explaining that if they didn't receive the remedy that is sought in the complaint filed in Federal Court, that they would file a state court claim.

Now, we responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in the State of Wisconsin, Brown County, and we filed — each of these cases were filed, I would imagine, within hours of each other this past Thursday. And so then here we are, probably essentially starting discovery, which because no

emergency has been established, probably what they're looking for, I would suggest to this Court.

To get into the (a) and (b), the questions the Court is asking, we have two datasets. Interesting discussion on what we call the Latvian e-mails or the Euroenergy Biogas e-mails. We, at Convergen, have no desire to retain those. In fact, some time ago we started the process to transfer them.

I'm not going to take time today to go through the technical aspects of that, but we've been working with our normal, third-party IT consultant to makes sure those e-mails were and are transferred out. There was a delay -- I shouldn't say a delay. The process required a new domain name to be established. My understanding is that that has been and that the migration is scheduled to take place in the next day or two. And so with respect to that aspect of the data, we have no desire to keep it and are willingly transferring it.

Certainly there is no need to bring a motion to acquire that. My understanding is the communication has been consistent as to how, what that process is going to be and how it's running. And so from our point of view, that within a day or two will be a moot point.

With respect to the broader set of data, this is the data that was transferred at the sale January 31, and it includes very sensitive --

THE COURT: Are you now talking about all of the data

that is in the ConvergenEnergy.com Office 365 account?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. LaFROMBOIS: So there is, as anybody can imagine, when you buy a company and substantially all of the assets of the company, all of the intellectual property comes with it.

And inside the database of the e-mail is -- the e-mail and attachments, are probably -- all of these most likely, nearly all of the intellectual property of the company. That if somebody acquired all of those e-mails, they certainly could be a fierce competitor to Convergen Energy Wisconsin.

And that's the subject of the complaint that was filed in Wisconsin. It's the subject of the complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, and there is no emergency. So we need to use the legal process in a reasonable way, not in a way that says this is a fire that we need to put out. It's really not. And we have an opportunity to have that litigated, for the parties to determine their respective rights, and we're looking forward to doing that.

With respect to this order, today what we request is that the Court deny the temporary restraining order. They'll get part of their remedy regardless because of the Latvian e-mails being transferred in the very near future.

And then these issues, because they are complicated and there's multiple agreements and we see factual

inconsistencies in the plaintiffs' pleadings, that we would request two weeks to brief this issue and would hold and request a hearing because there's a factual question whether there's an emergency, and then there are factual questions of what is the basis for their request.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple of questions. I noticed that you did not address (a), and I do need to think about balance of hardships. Is there any hardship to you with respect to an order that you not access, disclose, copy or convey plaintiffs' electronic files, or engage in activity that uses plaintiffs' proprietary data or trade secrets?

I mean, there may ultimately be a fact issue down the line as to what belongs to plaintiff and what doesn't. But are you really going to suffer any hardship from an order that goes to (a)?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Yes, your Honor. Your Honor, I think the issue with (a) is that it's a narrow — to think about this narrowly, we fully intend to retain the data as it is today.

I'm not saying today to suggest that there has been any manipulation of the data. The dataset is what it is. The company was bought. It continued to use the same system going forward, and they would intend to do so.

But as far as purging or modifying or in any way compromising the data so that an accurate picture of what has occurred between all of the parties can be discovered and

discerned, we have no objection to that.

Getting into questions of use, of whose property is what gets into a very complicated question. Maybe we achieve — I would suggest to the Court that we achieve what we need to if we had a very narrow order or agreement that the data would not be deleted, purged or modified outside the normal course. Beyond —

THE COURT: Don't they also have a right to -- if it's their data, aren't they entitled to know that your client's not going to be disclosing it or using it, or engaging in activity that uses it?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Well, we certainly won't knowingly do that. We wouldn't knowingly do that, but they're asserting that they own data that we would assert that they do not. So we get into a factual conundrum. If we're working with a vendor and we need to disclose to that vendor certain specifications that they claim is their data, but that's in the normal course of business.

I think it would be an overbroad order at this point, but we would -- hard to believe, in a temporary restraining order, that we should be -- it would almost effectually cause us to -- put a real chilling effect on our business.

And the data, from our point of view, should be just retained so that it can, in the normal course and through the judicial process, be discerned what is the truth here. I don't

see an emergency. Even if they did have such an interest, what is the emergency in requiring that order today? There's no allegation that we have disclosed this to a third party inappropriately or in any way. There's just no showing of that.

THE COURT: What do you say about the risk of a cyber attack on the entity?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: My understanding, your Honor, was that there was a cyber attack to their Latvian organization. In response to that, they quickly moved their e-mail accounts to Convergen to protect them. So it's another element of the story.

We've had an operating agreement where Convergen has really been helping manage one of the Libra companies, and so the e-mails they're requesting back, my understanding is they're really brought over to Convergen to protect them. So there's been a significant change of perspective on their part in the better part of a month regarding whether they're safe or not.

In today's digital trail, everything is going to be —whatever they do is going to be discoverable. There's no interest on our part to somehow use this data inappropriately. So from our point of view, we, just a little over a month ago, were used as a safe harbor for these e-mails. It's just taken a month to get them transferred back out so that they can

respond.

I don't believe there's any allegation that the setting of those e-mails at this point in time are at risk of some type of cyber attack. And as I said, the e-mails are set to be moved, migrated out to the new domain name as early as tomorrow.

THE COURT: You made a suggestion about when we would have a hearing, and I can't read my notes on that. What did you say?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Two weeks, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me turn back to plaintiffs' counsel.

What is your evidence that there is a risk that defendants will use or disclose your electronic files or your proprietary data?

There is something to the defendants' point that you've known that they've had this data for quite some time.

MR. STOLPER: Actually, no, your Honor. I'm glad you raised that. I wanted to clear that up.

And for the court reporter, this is Michael Stolper on behalf of the plaintiffs.

When counsel mentioned dates, I don't know if this was intentionally -- if it was done intentionally to confuse you, but our complaint made it clear that we found out about the fraud around February 1, shortly after the closing on the transaction. We didn't find out about the data breach until

mid to late April, when we started reaching out, and that was in response to a cyber attack. So those two dates are two different things.

So there could be absolutely no accusation that we sat on our hands somehow and that there isn't an emergency. I mean, it's pretty black letter law, especially in this circuit. If somebody has access to somebody else's electronic files, e-mails, data storage or otherwise, that's a problem. That's an emergency. They have our data on their phones, on their laptops, and they have access to it through this administrator access.

So you asked me the question of what evidence do I have? They used our data secretly to raise money to buy a business secretly and covertly to double deal, you know, at a price that's at least \$10 million less than what it's worth. So they took our data already. That's what we've complained about.

They took our data and they used it to, as part of this fraudulent scheme, and then when we asked for the data back -- data that when we raised the issue in April, particularly with Latvia, because Latvia has nothing to do with their business in Wisconsin. And when we asked for it back, they didn't give it to us.

Now, they have no reason not to give it to us unless there's something to hide, but in terms of what evidence we

have, it's all in the complaint; it's all in that affidavit from Phaedra, our client, articulating all that they did as part of disclosing our data to perpetuate their scheme.

They're continuing to do it.

And counsel indicated that this fraud claim is spurious, but we have a recorded confession that we've quoted in our complaint, and that's also referenced in our client declaration, from Mr. Brooks, the man who orchestrated it.

And what counsel says to you, your Honor, part of their defense is Libra knew, but the problem with that statement is that Libra, here in this case, is in the form of Mr. Brooks. That's the person who was trusted with carrying this out on behalf of Libra, but it turns out he was compromised, unbeknownst to everybody else at Libra.

So we do have an emergency. We do need relief today, and I think that what we've articulated in (a) -- certainly what counsel was doing was conflating (b) and (c), because (b) is Latvia and (c) is Convergen.

THE COURT: So would you tell me what parts of the declaration you want me to focus on in terms of when you learned about the use and the risk of misuse?

MR. STOLPER: Sure. There is a -- are you asking for a particular paragraph number?

THE COURT: Yes. I've now got the emergency declaration of Phaedra -- I can't pronounce it.

MR. STOLPER: Chrousos. I may have said it wrong, but she's not on the line to correct me. It is -- I'll give you the exact paragraph number. I'm just scrolling through. Here, it's on paragraph 9. It talks about when we found out about the unlawful access that was triggered by the cyber attack.

And the fraudulent scheme, the disclosure of the fraudulent scheme is articulated in the paragraphs that preceded that. And it talks about finding out in paragraph 6, 7 and 8. But the scheme is laid out in greater detail in the complaint.

This declaration was intended to articulate why we needed this emergency relief, and that's really triggered by what we learned in April, and that's starting at paragraph 9 under the heading, Cyber Tech Uncovered Defendants' Unlawful Access.

THE COURT: Okay. Give me one moment, counsel -MR. STOLPER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- to review this.

(Pause)

MR. BILLINGS: While you're doing that, your Honor, this is Ryan Billings, I just want to note I'd like to be heard on behalf of the defendants that I represent.

THE COURT: Okay. You will be. Just give me a moment.

MR. BILLINGS: Thank you, your Honor.

(Pause)

THE COURT: So you'll have to correct me if I'm wrong with respect to this, but the way that I read paragraphs 9 through 14 is that that's how you discovered that they had your information. It doesn't contain evidence with respect to their misuse of your information.

MR. STOLPER: The misuse of the information comes from the complaint, where we talk about how they used our information to conduct this fraudulent scheme, but in this declaration, it also, in the subsequent paragraphs, where their efforts — where it talks about the efforts to deny access for no reason, and then it talks about the failure to return equipment even though the equipment was promised, that's in the — let me see here.

This was in paragraphs -- yes, in paragraphs 15 on talks about all of the sort of obfuscating that was going on, and then the equipment, the, yes, we'll turn over the equipment and then not turning over the equipment, all that conduct -- you know, the inference from that conduct is there's a coverup here and there's mal intent going on.

I mean, I don't have -- at least not yet, I don't have an e-mail that shows that last week they sent our data off to some third party or they're using it to price something to hurt us. I wouldn't have that visibility, nor is that the burden or the standard I'm up against. What we've articulated is a

fraudulent scheme that they did, in part, by using our data that they shouldn't have had and by sharing it with third parties, the Spanish investors, the prospective purchasers of the business who ultimately purchased the business, that's defendant Merle, Greg Merle who's represented on this call.

These are people who are all given insider access to information based d on double-dealing executives, three of them, and so that's what's articulated in the complaint and referenced in summary fashion in this declaration.

And then in this declaration we talk about now that they've been caught, how have they behaved in response to that? And all of that paints a very, very negative picture of what they've done, what they're trying to do. And the Latvian e-mails are really the best example of that because counsel is talking about transferring tomorrow, but in this declaration we point out that they've been proposing this transfer. But why the transfer? It isn't really giving us what we need. Those are our files.

Transferring it to another domain cuts off the history of those files and the electronic fingerprints associated with those files. It's like they stole the car, but they want to give me back the bumper. You know, they're not giving me back my car, and so — and they're saying, well, we're going to transfer the wheels or we'll give you some parts. But I need the whole car, and I need to look at where this car has been.

I need my car back, and that's not what they're giving us.

And they were proposing that through stall tactics over the last couple of weeks, and in our declaration we point out that that -- we explained to them why that wasn't acceptable, but yet, to you, now that we've called them on it, they're trying to put that up as somehow that that's satisfactory but it's not.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from Mr. Billings.

MR. BILLINGS: Thank you, your Honor. I don't want to repeat anything that Mr. LaFrombois said, but I do want to make four very quick points.

The first is that it is plaintiffs' burden on this motion, under Rule 65(b)(1)(B), to set forth specific facts in an affidavit that clearly show that immediate irreparable injury will result before defendants can be heard. The only evidence put forth before the Court is the declaration of Ms. Chrousos.

Allegations in the complaint are just that. They are not facts; so only the declaration is evidentiary. And it's very clearly not based on personal knowledge. Ms. Chrousos doesn't even infer that it's under personal knowledge. It's littered with hearsay, double hearsay, speculation, conjecture, conclusory statements. It provides no basis to establish that, as a chief strategy officer, not an IT person, she has any background to confidently testify as to the IT risk posed by

the status quo.

With respect to the records and who owns what, that is set forth in the sale documents, which the plaintiffs have not put before the Court. As Mr. LaFrombois said, there are six pages in those documents that govern who owns what and that's not before your Honor. They're asking for this relief without putting forth the documents that establish the ownership rights. So that's point No. 1. There is no specific evidence, based on personal knowledge, that is competent before this Court to establish irreparable injury.

The second point is that granting the order, in terms of balancing the hardships, would cause irreparable harm to our clients. The order to show cause is vastly overbroad, and I think your Honor picked up on this. Gaining administrative access to Convergen Wisconsin's Office 365 account would give plaintiff control over all e-mails of Convergen Wisconsin, including e-mails after the sale, such as privileged communications between client and counsel about this lawsuit. Obviously, that can't be turned over.

And just as plaintiffs allege that the e-mail communications of Convergen Wisconsin prior to the sale involve trade secrets and highly sensitive information, so too do the communications after the sale. And the rights to these e-mails are establishing contracts that plaintiffs did not provide to the Court or describe.

Another specific element to Mr. Brooks is that if you look at what devices they're asking to be turned over, the order is vague on that point. They say devices that have been used in the course of employment. Does that mean ever? A personal cell phone that took one call, does Mr. Brooks have to turn over? Because in Ms. Chrousos' affidavit there's an iPhone 11 mentioned, which is Mr. Brooks' personal phone. The plaintiffs have no claim of right to that whatsoever.

The iPhone 8 that they describe is in Mr. Brooks'

New York apartment. He's in Connecticut sheltering in place.

He would have to travel to New York to pick up the phone and breach quarantine. He lives with his elderly mother, who's an at-risk person. There's no reason to do that.

The third point is that there are threshold jurisdictional and venue issues here. There are many documents associated with the sale. At least two of the documents have — agreements have mandatory arbitration clauses. At least two of the agreements provide for exclusive jurisdiction in Wisconsin, and in addition, there are questions of personal jurisdiction and over two Spanish nationals and Spanish entities who invested in the sale and whose rights would be impacted by any TRO.

And lastly, the plaintiffs' motion papers don't address the bond required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c): No TRO or preliminary injunction can be granted unless

a security in an amount the Court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained is posted. Plaintiffs don't address that at all.

And these are just the four points that came up in the two hours since I represented — been retained by two of my clients. The overall point is this is incredibly complicated. The parties are a mile apart on the facts, and the Court deserves to hear from both sides fully in briefing before any decision is made.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I'm going to ask all of the parties to hold on for a moment while I consider the papers. It will give the court reporter a break, and I also want to consult with my chambers staff. So why don't you all hold for a moment.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Good afternoon again. This is Judge

Liman. So I've got a question for defense counsel, and then

I'll turn back to plaintiffs' counsel. It's with respect to

(b) of the TRO, with respect to the EuroenergyBiogas.com Office

365 accounts and domain.

Did you tell me that your client is in the process of doing exactly what is requested in (b)?

MR. BILLINGS: This is Ryan Billings. That was a statement by Mr. LaFrombois. I believe he might be on might

mute. But yes, it is in process and we understand it will be completed in a day or two.

THE COURT: Okay. And --

MR. LaFROMBOIS: This is attorney Ben LaFrombois. I'm sorry, if I may. I was talking. I had my phone on mute to be respectful of the Court.

The answer is yes, as Ryan pointed out. I do believe that, technically speaking, that was an allegation raised from the plaintiff that these would not be the complete accounts and the complete information on these accounts. My understanding is that it would be. Now, that may be a technical question, if the Court deems it appropriate to dig into that question. But we have no interest in this data, and we would just as soon not have it in our possession, and that is in the process of being transferred as early as tomorrow.

THE COURT: Let me turn back to the plaintiff. Is it, in fact, consistent with your understanding?

MR. STOLPER: No, your Honor. At paragraph 18 of the Chrousos declaration, the one I was referring to earlier, and it enumerates why this proposed transfer is insufficient, and that's why we included that in our application. If it were sufficient and it were fine, we wouldn't have an issue with it.

We have plenty to -- we have plenty in our complaint. We don't need to add allegations and claims if unnecessary, but in this instance, what they're proposing was unsatisfactory to

my clients, to their IT personnel, who are certainly more well-versed than I am in the technicalities of what they were proposing, which is why she wrote what she wrote here in this statement.

THE COURT: And let me tell you what --

MR. LaFROMBOIS: This is attorney Ben LaFrombois. May I respond, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LaFROMBOIS: The issue of why these accounts need to be moved into a separate domain is because within the Convergen Energy account, we kind of distinguish between administrator rights for the Latvian accounts and administrator rights for all of the other Convergen accounts.

So to give access to the Latvian accounts means you have access to all of the intellectual property whose ownership is in dispute here; so those two can't be divided. The way to divide it is to take the new domain name, which has been created, and transfer those Latvian accounts out.

So to give administrator rights for the Latvian accounts is just the back door -- actually, it's the front door to all the other e-mail accounts that are in dispute.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand the disagreement between the parties. Let me tell you what I'd like to do, and my hope is that the defendants will consent to this because it's only going to be short term, for two weeks.

But it seems to me, without addressing everything in the order to show cause, that with respect to (a), the plaintiffs are entitled to that, and the defendants are not going to suffer any prejudice from that. There will be a time period for sorting out what actually is plaintiffs' and what actually is defendants'.

If the defendants were to knowingly access and use or disclose plaintiffs' electronic files, that would be wrong, and the plaintiffs are entitled to an order of the Court with respect to (a).

With respect to (b), these are complicated issues, and it seems to me that the right answer is that for the two-week period of the TRO, that the order that I should enter, it's not quite what the plaintiffs want me to do or what the defendants want me to do. It would be an order that would prevent the defendants from accessing, disclosing, copying or otherwise using, destroying or impairing any of the data in the EuroenergyBiogas.com Office 365 accounts or in the EuroenergyBiogas.com domain, or in any way preventing the plaintiffs from ultimately being able to acquire the administer rights.

So in other words, what I'm asking for is a standstill with respect to (b), but that if it is determined ultimately, at a preliminary injunction hearing, that the plaintiffs are entitled that it's requested in (b), that can be given. If

they're not entitled to it, the defendants will not be any the worse off because the defendants have said they don't want any of that data and that information.

With respect to (c), I would just enter an order that would restrain the defendants, in any way, from destroying, deleting, altering, or making any changes to any of the historical e-mails, data, audit logs, or any other data or e-mails that belong to the plaintiffs, and that would restrain the plaintiffs from viewing the e-mails and data, period, period. In other words, the defendants can't destroy, delete or the like any of the data that belongs to the plaintiffs on the Office 365 account.

With respect to (d), the defendants would be ordered to retain all of the computer, cells phones and other hardware utilized during their employment with respective plaintiff entities, and not to delete or destroy or alter any of the data that belongs to plaintiff on those computers, cell phones and hardware.

With respect to (e), it seems to me that it does make sense for there to be expedited discovery and for us to have a hearing in two weeks' time, if that's what the parties want. I can set aside time two weeks from today, or you might decide that you can live with this restraining order for a little bit longer and you want a little bit more time to do discovery. What I would ask is for the parties to meet and confer with

respect to how much time they need, if they need time, more time beyond the two weeks. Period, that's it.

Let me address defendants. Why shouldn't I enter an order to that effect, and are you comfortable with it, recognizing you don't want it, you don't want any order?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Your Honor, I would — recognizing that we would not want any order, to be clear, with respect to (b), that my understanding is the EuroenergyBiogas.com account is now established, that your order would permit us to provide the administrator rights to that account and not retain any rights to it, if that would be permitted?

THE COURT: I think with respect to that -- and it's useful clarification -- you can provide the administrator rights with the consent of the plaintiffs. So if all of you agree that what you are providing is what the plaintiffs want, just having the effect of eliminating a trail of information, or giving the plaintiffs the hubcaps and not the car, to use the plaintiffs' analogy, and plaintiffs object, then you're not going to do that. You're just going to have a standstill and we can sort it all out in two weeks.

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Other than that clarification, your Honor, that was the clarification that I was seeking as I was listening to your proposed order.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me turn to Mr. Billings. Do you have something to say? Then I'm going to turn to

plaintiffs' counsel.

MR. BILLINGS: Thank you, your Honor. And, you know, I think that everybody, plaintiffs and defendants, have been under a preservation obligation since they reasonably anticipated suit. So I'm not certain that we necessarily need an injunction to establish that; it attaches by operation of law.

My only concern is that there's a disagreement on (a) between the parties as to what belongs to the plaintiffs and what doesn't. And for instance, let's say that to continue to operate the business they bought, one, a party needs to look at an e-mail from January 30th of 2020 or a contract signed on January 4th of 2020, I don't want to suddenly run afoul of the Court order in the course of normal operations of the business. That's the only ambiguity I'm concerned about.

Otherwise, being in the same position as Mr.

LaFrombois, I don't want any order, but I guess I can live with one along those lines.

THE COURT: Well, listen, with respect to that, I understand there may be disagreements on the margin, and if there's a disagreement in the margin and it can't wait two weeks to bring it to the Court, you're going to bring it to the Court earlier, or else you'll proceed at your own peril.

Let me turn to plaintiffs' counsel.

MR. STOLPER: Thank you, your Honor. This is Michael

Stolper on behalf of the plaintiffs and I, as the recipient of your proposed order, I'm appreciative of it. And I have only two comments or two concerns with two pieces of it.

One has to do with audit logs that are referenced in the order, in our proposed order to showcase, and also in the declaration. My understanding is that audit logs are sort of the electronic fingerprints of what's transpired with respect to an Office 365 account, and they have — audit logs are maintained for a set period of time, and there's usually a default period of time for those things to remain in place.

What we would ask for is that the audit logs -- and they control the administrator rights, you need the administrator rights to modify the period in which the audit logs are maintained. We'd like, as part of your order, to instruct the defendants that are in control of the administrator rights of the various accounts that are in issue, that they extend the audit logs for as long as possible under the Office 365 platform. That was one issue, your Honor.

The second is my concern about the cyber attacks. So if we put everything on hold for two weeks with respect to the Latvia account, my understanding is that transferring what the defendants had proposed about creating this new domain and giving us administrator rights to this new account, to which our old files would be transferred, my understanding is that that will not forestall or protect us against cyber attacks and

now if we're talking about a two-week period.

So I think we have exposure under what's being proposed. Even if we were to consent to it offline with counsel, and they said, over the next two weeks, why don't we just do this transfer and to the extent you have issues, we'll deal with it in two weeks at a hearing, that would be fine except I think that also leaves us exposed to cyber attack, which is some of the relief that we're seeking.

I have no problem if — if the only objection that is heard is — because this is Latvia. This has nothing to do with the Wisconsin plant. If the issue is that access to Latvia somehow gives, whomever is given access to Latvia, some visibility into the defendant's files on a going concern, then we have no problem putting it in the hands of a third party, you know, computer consultant to execute what's instructed. In other words, to put whatever protections are in place, do whatever transfers of our data and our files, you know, have a third party do it so that we don't have visibility into what they're concerned about. But let's not lose sight of the fact that for Latvia, these are our files, our assets, and they have no rights to them.

THE COURT: With respect to the second point, it very well may make sense for two of you, after this conference is over and in the next couple of days, to have a conversation about whether there is a way to accommodate your respective

interests. And I'm sure that the defendants don't have a desire to be in possession of information that may be the subject of a cyber attack for which they might have liability if they permit the cyber attack and that is of no value to them.

So I don't think today I can sort out the technical issues that you've raised. In fact, I know I can't. I might be able to and will sort them out in two weeks' time, if I have to, but you may be better off if you are able to work that out yourselves.

With respect to the audit logs, from the defendants' perspective, I would think that you would have to do something like that anyway in terms of document preservation. So any objection to that being part of the order?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: Your Honor, we think that there's good reason to meet and confer on these technical issues, and there is a third-party consultant that's addressing this matter for us. So I think it would helpful to have that meeting to confer with counsel on the technical issues. This is attorney Ben LaFrombois.

THE COURT: For defense counsel, do you have an objection to including in the order that you will instruct the administrator to extend the audit logs for as far as possible so as to retain the record of activity within the accounts?

MR. LaFROMBOIS: We have no objection to giving that

instruction to our consultant.

THE COURT: All right. So, listen, I'm going to talk about scheduling in a moment, but we are going to enter a revised TRO that will attempt to capture what I have just laid out. What I may ask the two of you to do is to meet and confer and see if it is clear and if you would suggest any revisions, but you have the gist of my thinking and you'll have it in the TRO that I'm going to issue. The TRO will be effective, but I'll also entertain an application to revise it to make it clearer.

With respect to, did you all want a hearing in two weeks' time?

MR. STOLPER: Yes, your Honor. This is Michael
Stolper on behalf of the plaintiffs. The answer would be yes.

THE COURT: That is June 2nd, and I'm just looking at my calendar. We can do it June 2nd at 2:00 p.m. It will be done remotely, either telephonically or with video, and I'm not sure yet. I'll entertain suggestions by the parties as to how they want to do it, and I'm also going to permit expedited discovery.

With respect to briefing on the application for the preliminary injunction, I would like it to be completed by May 29th. Then I've got the weekend with the papers. Why don't you meet and confer with respect to a schedule for papers on a preliminary injunction. If you're not able to come up

with a joint proposal, you can each make separate proposals. I think for some order around this, why don't you make the proposals by Thursday at 5:00 p.m.

MR. STOLPER: That sounds like a reasonable plan, your Honor.

In terms of a schedule -- this is Michael Stolper on behalf of the plaintiffs. I just wanted to mention, your Honor, that I welcome the meet-and-confer concept to try to work through some of these technical issues. What I just want to do, the Court's been gracious with it's time so far and its availability. I don't want to offend the Court's sensibility.

If, for some reason, that we're unable to, and I don't want to jinx us, but if we are unable to work through the concerns I have about a cyber attack, pending our June 2nd conference, I just want the ability to come back to the Court if we do need some type of relief that we couldn't work out on our own prior to June 2nd.

THE COURT: That's okay.

MR. STOLPER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You've got that permission.

MR. STOLPER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else from defense counsel?

MR. BILLINGS: Your Honor, this is Ryan Billings. My only, I guess, caveat is that none of my clients have been served yet, and so we're not even in this lawsuit. So we will

do our best to incorporate ourselves into this plan, but it's going to be a little bit complicated for us; so we'd appreciate your Honor's patience in sorting out that issue.

MR. STOLPER: I thought you had waived service, Ryan, and you were just looking for a waiver form from us. Are you withdrawing that? Because I thought you said you did want service. We had process served everyone else, but you had said in your e-mail to me, you said that you were agreeing to a waiver, that we didn't have to deal with process servers, and so we pulled back the process server from serving your client based on that e-mail. Are you changing your position?

MR. BILLINGS: My position was and remains that I will sign an FRCP4(d) waiver, if you send it to me, and then we'll go from there.

MR. STOLPER: That's what we'll do.

MR. BILLINGS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. Listen, if there are good objections to my jurisdiction, I am sure I will hear that from the parties.

MR. BILLINGS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everybody.

Thank you to the court reporter.

Let me ask, before we all get off the phone, since this is the plaintiffs' application, for the plaintiff to order a copy of this transcript on an expedited basis, and if you've

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K5JPCONO
      got questions about how to do that, you can stay on with the
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      court reporter after I hang up from this call.
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               MR. STOLPER: Thank you, your Honor. Will do.
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               THE COURT: Thank you, all.
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               (Adjourned)
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